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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Respondent petitions for rehearing of this Court's 
holding that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (1992) violates the Utah 
Constitution, and is thus invalid. In support of its Petition, 
Respondent improperly raises several arguments for the first 
time. Respondent actually appears to be seeking an entirely new 
hearing, rather than a rehearing of issues raised on appeal but 
misconstrued or misapprehended. Moreover, Respondent's arguments 
are unsupported by, or even contradict, Utah law. 
As demonstrated below, the Utah Court of Appeals is 
constitutionally and statutorily empowered to pass on the 
constitutional validity of a statute. In assessing the validity 
of § 78-12-31.1, the Court properly concluded that the habeas 
corpus provision of the Utah Constitution affords Appellant Carl 
McClellan ("McClellan") the civil remedy he seeks. Thus, the 
Court correctly employed a heightened standard of review pursuant 
to the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Respondent Cannot Raise Arguments in Support of 
its Petition for Rehearing That it Failed to Raise 
on Appeal. 
The arguments in Respondent's Petition for Rehearing 
are here raised for the first time. Notwithstanding that 
McClellan clearly had put the constitutionality of § 78-12-31.1 
at issue in his appeals brief, (see Brief for Appellant at 6-12), 
Respondent did not advance the positions represented in its 
Petition in either its response brief or at oral argument. On 
appeal, McClellan argued that § 78-12-31.1 unconstitutionally 
infringed on due process rights secured by the Utah 
Constitution's habeas corpus provision, (Brief for Appellant at 
6-7); only now does Respondent attempt to argue that Utah's 
habeas corpus provision affords relief only in cases of a 
sentencing court's imperfect jurisdiction, (Respondent's Pet. 
Reh. at 5-8). Also on appeal, McClellan argued that § 78-12-31.1 
violated the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution by 
impairing his right to habeas corpus relief, (Brief for Appellant 
at 7-9); only now does Respondent attempt to argue that the open 
courts provision is inapplicable because the habeas corpus 
remedies it safeguards do not include due process rights, 
(Respondent's Pet. Reh. at 5-8). Further, notwithstanding that 
McClellan brought his constitutional challenge before this Court, 
Respondent has waited until now to contest this Court's 
jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of a statute, 
fid, at 3-5.) 
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that a 
petition for rehearing shall particularly describe "the points of 
law or fact which the petitioner claims the court has overlooked 
or misapprehended." Utah R. App. P. 35(a). The rule seems 
designed to afford a court an opportunity to remedy mistakes. 
However, this Court could not have "overlooked" or 
"misapprehended" claimed points of law which Respondent never 
brought to its attention. This Court should not allow Respondent 
to supplement its appeals brief under the subterfuge of a 
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petition for rehearing. See, e.g.. State v. Sampson. 808 P.2d 
1100, 1112 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).l 
II, This Court Has Constitutional and Statutory 
Authority to Declare a Statute Unconstitutional, 
Respondent argues that, under the Utah Constitution, 
the Utah Supreme Court is the only Utah court empowered to 
declare a statute unconstitutional. She bases this argument on 
an inference from language in the Utah Constitution stating that 
"[t]he [supreme] court shall not declare any law unconstitutional 
. . . except on concurrence of a majority of all justices of the 
Supreme Court." Utah Const, art. VIII, § 2. From this language, 
she makes the substantial leap that not only must a majority of 
the Court concur to invalidate a statute, but that only the 
Supreme Court is empowered to invalidate a statute. However, 
nothing in the quoted language or the surrounding language of 
article VIII, section 2, which defines the operating procedures 
of the Supreme Court, dictates such a result. Further, 
*In Sampson. the Court of Appeals noted its "standing 
aversion to considering for the first time at some later stage 
issues that could have been raised at an earlier stage," and 
stated "we ordinarily will not consider arguments presented for 
the first time on petition for rehearing." 808 P.2d at 1112. 
The Court, however, felt the synergy of several factors existing 
in the case warranted an exception. There were voluminous issues 
of significant complexity; the State7s brief greatly exceeded the 
page limit for briefs even without addressing several issues; the 
United States Supreme Court rendered a helpful opinion subsequent 
to initial argument; and the newly raised issue was important to 
a proper disposition of the case. Id. at 1112-13. 
Even if the issues Respondent raises in her Petition 
for Rehearing are deemed important to the resolution of the 
instant case, the other factors listed in Sampson are 
inapplicable. Furthermore, Respondent had ample opportunity on 
appeal to make the arguments she raises in the Petition. 
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Respondent's creative interpretation ignores other important 
constitutional provisions sculpting the aegis of the State's 
judicial department. 
The Utah Constitution provides that judicial power in 
Utah shall vest in a Supreme Court and a trial court of general 
jurisdiction, "and in such other courts as the Legislature by 
statute shall establish." Utah Const, art. VIII, § 1. The 
constitution further provides that the jurisdiction of such 
"other courts, both original and appellate, shall be provided by 
statute." Id. § 5. Respondent essentially argues that the 
constitutional language requiring that the Supreme Court declare 
a statute unconstitutional by a majority impliedly limits the 
Legislature's authority to establish the jurisdiction of 
appellate courts. This argument by implication, however, ignores 
a "fundamental principlef]" of state constitutional law. Trade 
Comm'n v. Skaaas Drug Centers. Inc., 446 P.2d 958, 962 (Utah 
1968). As the Court in State v. Tavlor, 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 
1983), noted, "Clearly, the Legislature has the power to confer 
appellate jurisdiction in connection with the decisions of any 
inferior court where such jurisdiction is not expressly 
prohibited by the Constitution. Appellate jurisdiction . . . may 
exist by virtue of a constitutional grant or by statute." Id. at 
441. Thus, implied constitutional limitations on the 
Legislature's power "'are not, and should not be, favored, and 
ought not be imposed by the courts, except where the implication 
is both necessary and unavoidable.'" Id. at 443-44 (quoting 
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McCashland v. Keocrh, 88 P. 680, 682 (Utah 1906))). As the Skaaas 
Court explained, ,fthe legislature of the state is not a 
government of powers limited to those expressly granted, as is 
the federal government . • . . The legislature of the state, 
which represents the people and thus the sovereign, has all of 
the residuum of power of government, except only as expressly 
restricted by the Constitution." 446 P.2d at 962; Wood v, Budge, 
374 P.2d 516, 518 (Utah 1962); Parkinson v. Watson, 291 P.2d 400, 
405 (Utah 1955). Thus, Respondent's suggestion of 
constitutionally implied limitations on the Legislature's power 
to define the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals would overturn 
one of the most central tenets of our nation's political system. 
Because the Constitution does not expressly limit the 
Legislature's authority to define this Court's jurisdiction, the 
proper focus is whether the Legislature has authorized the Court 
of Appeals to declare a law unconstitutional. See TaylorP 664 
P.2d at 442. 
In 1986, the Utah Legislature created the Utah Court of 
Appeals. Act of April 28, 1986, ch. 47, § 44, 1986 Utah Laws 
115, 135. The Legislature provided the Court with appellate 
jurisdiction over, inter alia, "cases transferred to the Court of 
Appeals from the Supreme Court." Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) 
(Supp. 1993). Importantly, in defining the Supreme Court's 
appellate jurisdiction, the Legislature specifically allowed that 
court to "transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters 
5 
over which the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction."2 Id, § 
78-2-2(4). Therefore, because the Utah Constitution empowers the 
Supreme Court to declare a law unconstitutional, Utah Const, art. 
VIII, S 2, it may "pour over" that determination to the Court of 
Appeals. 
This interpretation is bolstered by the statute 
providing the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over "a final 
judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face 
under the Constitution of the United States or the Utah 
Constitution." Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(g) (Supp. 1993). This 
language assumes that the Court of Appeals, as a court of record, 
id. § 78-2a-l (1992), has jurisdiction to consider the 
constitutional validity of a statute.3 
Taken to its logical conclusion, Respondent7s argument 
also challenges the authority of a district court to measure a 
law against a constitutional yardstick. Yet the Supreme Court 
2The Legislature created exceptions to this rule, but none 
of them apply to a constitutional determination. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(4)(a)-(e) (Supp. 1993). 
Respondent concedes that the Court of Appeals may affirm 
the constitutional validity of a statute, but argues that it must 
transfer the determination to the Utah Supreme Court when the 
Court of Appeals believes a statute is unconstitutional. In 
other words, this Court may pass on the constitutionality of a 
law only to affirm it — a strange sort of partial jurisdiction. 
Further, Respondent suggests that this Court may determine that a 
statute is unconstitutional, but that it must then transfer the 
case to the Utah Supreme Court for a binding determination. This 
not only would be a tremendous waste of judicial resources, but 
would frustrate the very purpose for which the Court of Appeals 
was created — to reduce the Supreme Court's case load. 
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has upheld district court determinations that a statute is 
unconstitutional. See, e.g.. Salt Lake Citv v. Wheeler, 466 P.2d 
838, 838-40 (Utah 1970) (affirming district court's invalidation 
of statute allowing warrantless search of premises licensed for 
consumption of liquor). It would be anomalous indeed for a 
district court to be empowered to find a statute 
unconstitutional, but for the Court of Appeals to be unable to 
fully review that decision on appeal* 
In sum# nothing in the Utah Constitution prohibits a 
court other than the Utah Supreme Court from declaring a statute 
unconstitutional. On the contrary, the Constitution authorizes 
the Legislature to create appellate courts of record and to 
define their jurisdiction. Pursuant to this authority, the 
Legislature established the Court of Appeals and empowered it to 
pass on the constitutional validity of state statutes. Contrary 
to Respondent's contentions, this Court should not elevate a 
procedural mechanism governing the operative capacity of the 
Supreme Court to a substantive limitation on the constitutional 
authority of the Legislature to define the jurisdiction of other 
courts of record. 
III. The Habeas Corpus Provision of the Utah 
Constitution Affords Appellant a Remedy Which Is 
Protected from Legislative Abrogation by the Utah 
Constitution's Open Courts Provision. 
This Court correctly determined that the statute of 
limitations in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (1992) impinges on the 
Utah Constitution's habeas corpus provision, Utah Const, art. I, 
§ 5, and thus implicates the State's open courts provision, Utah 
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Const, art. I, § 11. Accordingly, in evaluating the 
constitutionality of S 78-12-31.1, this Court properly employed a 
heightened standard of scrutiny. Respondent's argument to the 
contrary advances a pinched conception of the safeguards 
established by Utah's open courts and habeas corpus provisions 
that is contrary to well-established Utah law. 
The open courts provision was promulgated to ensure 
"that an individual could not be arbitrarily deprived of 
effective remedies designed to protect basic individual rights." 
Berry ex rel. Berrv v. Beech Aircraft Corp.. 717 P.2d 670, 675 
(Utah 1985). As the Berrv Court elaborated, M[w]hat section 11 
is primarily concerned with is not particular, identifiable 
causes of action as such, but with the availability of legal 
remedies for vindicating the great interest that individuals in a 
civilized society have in the integrity of their persons, 
property, and reputations." Id. at 677 n.4. 
The writ of habeas corpus is designed to protect 
against impairment of such basic individual rights. The Utah 
Supreme Court has defined the writ as "one of the most important 
of all judicial tools for the protection of individual liberty." 
Hurst v. Cook. 777 P.2d 1029, 1034 (Utah 1989); see also Thompson 
v. Harris. 144 P.2d 761, 766 (Utah 1943) (describing habeas 
corpus as "the precious safeguard of personal liberty"). Thus, 
if the open courts provision protects any claims, it must protect 
those of the constitutional significance of Utah's habeas corpus 
provision. 
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Notwithstanding the provision's fundamental role in 
safeguarding individual liberty, Respondent seeks to unravel 
decades of habeas corpus jurisprudence in Utah and restrict the 
provision to its function at common law. Respondent argues that 
the habeas provision in the Utah Constitution currently affords 
no greater protection than that provided at common law, and cites 
Hurst for the proposition that at common law habeas corpus was 
only applicable to questions of jurisdiction. Respondent 
apparently failed to notice the very next sentence in Hurst, 
which states: "However, even before the adoption of post-
conviction-type remedies in this state, this Court recognized 
that the writ of habeas corpus had a broader application to 
criminal proceedings than merely testing whether a conviction or 
sentence falls within the authority of the court." Hurst, 777 
P.2d at 1034. That habeas corpus protects constitutional rights 
regardless of whether the alleged error is jurisdictional in 
nature was recognized in Utah at least as early as 1943. See 
Thompson, 144 P.2d at 766 ("it has been held that the writ will 
lie if the petitioner has been deprived of one of his 
constitutional rights such as due process of law."). Thus, as 
the Supreme Court concluded in Hurst, the function of habeas 
corpus in Utah "is to provide a means for collaterally attacking 
convictions when they are so constitutionally flawed that they 
result in fundamental unfairness and to provide for collateral 
attack of sentences not authorized by law." Hurst, 777 P.2d at 
1034-35 (emphasis added). 
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Respondent also argues that this Court has conflated 
the post-conviction remedies of Rule 65B with the habeas corpus 
provision of the Utah Constitution. However, the true confusion 
exists in Respondent's own argument. Rule 65B merely 
"establish[es] procedural rules for implementation of habeas and 
post-conviction relief remedies.11 Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1032. 
Thus, the Rule does not create substantive causes of action 
separate from the habeas provision in the Constitution, but 
instead breathes life into remedies that inhere in the provision 
itself. See, e.g., Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b) (listing procedural 
rules for attacking wrongful imprisonment); Hurst, 777 P.2d at 
1033 ("Although a post-conviction relief remedy and the writ of 
habeas corpus have sometimes been thought to be separate 
procedures, the writ of habeas corpus has, over the years, 
absorbed the post-conviction relief remedy to form a single 
constitutional remedy."). 
This Court correctly interpreted the scope of the 
habeas corpus provision in the Utah Constitution — it protects 
rights to fundamental fairness as well as prohibiting 
extrajurisdictional exercises of judicial authority. 
Respondent's interpretation ignores the Utah Supreme Court's 
express construction of the provision. Given that the Supreme 
Court's interpretation that the habeas corpus provision assures 
more than jurisdictional remedies, this Court properly determined 
that the statute of limitations in § 78-12-31.1 impinged upon 
McClellan's habeas corpus rights, thus implicating the open 
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courts provision and its heightened standard of review. If the 
open courts provision is to be taken seriously, it must at least 
protect express constitutional rights, such as habeas corpus. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
deny Respondent's Petition for Rehearing. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of October, 1993. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Steven J. Aeschbacher 
Arthur B. Berger 
Attorneys for Petitioner/ 
Appellant McClellan 
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